

Very secret

(3) of 70. What change would there be in Japan's international position, especially in her position as regards China as compared with the pre-Incident time, in the case the U.S. memorandum of Oct. 2, were fully accepted?

There are not a few points which are not clear yet in the negotiations up to now about how far the United States will accept Japan's requests in the so-called Oct. 2 draft (based on the June 27th draft). If however, the so-called four principles, as well as (1) the problem of the stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and French Indo-China, (2) non-discriminatory treatment regarding international trade in China and (3) the problem of the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact - were to be settled in accordance with the U.S. insistence, "The great task of the Imperial Government to bring the China Incident to a conclusion and to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would afford some scope for third Power participation and it appears that our independent diplomacy would be restricted to some extent, and we should have to be prepared as a result for the occurrence of a reactionary situation of considerable importance in our country; on the whole, however, there is hope that our position as regards China would be strengthened to some extent as compared with pre-Incident times, while on the other hand it would not be impossible to gradually establish the Co-prosperity Sphere by carrying out the peaceful progress of the Empire chiefly in Manchuria, China and French Indo-China; and by preserving our national defense at a time when the other Powers were exhausted with the War we could expect the Empire's voice to gain weight and we would consequently be able to prepare for future activity.

Such being the case, it cannot necessarily be admitted that we should sustain any substantial disadvantage, but the U.S. draft cannot be accepted as it is because there are not a few disadvantages when it is investigated in the light of various conditions both in the country and abroad.

1. Matters Relating to China and Manchuria.

(a) Under the present situation the negotiations between Japan and the United States are the only means of settling the China Incident there being no possibility that it will be settled by any other means.

(b) Though the U.S.'s four principles contain something to the effect that the existing situation should not be broken by means of armed force, the United States is making no objection to "the recognition of Manchukuo" which is one of the conditions of the peace treaty between Japan and China proposed by us, and if it should be realized the position of Manchukuo would be established all the more firmly.

(c) In case the principle of equality in international trade is recognized with regard to economic activities in China, there would not only be no particular disadvantage as compared with pre-Incident times; on the contrary, by adhering to the present established facts, a considerable preferential position might be retained. It must, however, be anticipated that Great Britain, the United States, and others might make various complaints in the future on the strength of the said principle.

(d) Even in case an agreement should not be reached between Japan and the United States on the stationing of troops, not only it is supposed that the United States would admit one or two years' extension of time but also it would not be quite impossible to have the stationing of troops admitted through direct negotiation between Japan and China in their peace negotiations.

(e) Though it is doubtful whether the hostile feelings of the Chinese would die out immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and China, it is expected that the people, impoverished by a war of many years, would welcome peace, that Japan and China would be reconciled, and that as a result, they would take a cooperative attitude in economic joint efforts.

(f) In view of the fact that the Chinese Government will include some high officials of the Nanking Government, a considerable degree of cooperation can be expected in political, economic, and other problems, especially in developing natural resources, withdrawing concessions, managing the system of maritime customs, and other matters."

2. Matters Relating to French Indo-China, Thailand, the Netherlands Indies, and others.

(a) As regards French Indo-China, we have already strengthened our predominant position by means of the existing various agreements between Japan and French Indo-China; Therefore, cooperation between the two countries could be furthered even after the withdrawal of troops had been carried out provided that our measures were proper.

(b) As regards Thailand, the fear of being invaded by the big Powers will be removed, accordingly the relations between Japan and Thailand will gradually be improved and furthered, and the purchase of the rice which is (one of) our necessities and other matters will be facilitated.

(c) As one result of the practice of the principle of equality in trade in the Netherlands Indies and other areas in the South, the acquisition of resources necessary for the defence of the Empire such as kerosene, gum, tin, bauxite, and so forth would be made easier.

3. Other Matters.

(a) It cannot be said that the advantages which would result from the improvement of Japanese-American relations would necessarily be greater than they were before the Incident, but on the removal of political uneasiness a new commercial treaty would eventually be concluded. In view of the effect of the European War, the purchase of goods and materials would suffer considerable limitations. Be that as it may, the acquisition of national defence resources in considerable quantities would become possible and along with the non-discriminatory treatment in Central and South America, this would to a great extent

exert a favorable influence toward the establishment of a new order in East Asia, and besides, would stand Japan and America in good stead by furnishing them with a basis on which they would be able to hold an important position in restoring peace of the world in future.

(b) Following the consolidation of our position in Soviet relations the ability to accomplish our requests through peaceful negotiation would gradually be increased. Further, the following should be recognized as disadvantages in case the American plan should be accepted:

- a) There would be danger of inviting interference by the big Powers concerning East Asia questions.
- b) Public opinion in Japan would become agitated.
- c) The Nine Power Treaty would be reconfirmed.
- d) There would be fear of its exercising an unfavorable influence on the relations between Japan, Germany and Italy.

## C E R T I F I C A T E

WDC No.                   
IPS No. 3111

### Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated 1947, and described as follows: "WHAT WOULD BE THE CHANGE IN JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN HER POSITION TOWARDS CHINA, AS COMPARED WITH THE PRE-INCIDENT TIME, IN CASE THE U.S. MEMORANDUM, DATED 2 OCTOBER, IS FULLY ACCEPTED."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of December 1947.

s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section.  
Official Capacity

### Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of December, 1947.

s/ Henry Shimojima  
NAME

Witness: s/ J. F. Munroe

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

極秘

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一〇ノ(二) 十月二日示免責金的二倍記セル場合右  
國ノ國様地位就中誠天地位ハ事變前ニ免シ如何  
ニ變化スルヤ

示國側ニ於テ所謂十月二日(六月二十一日)示  
ヲ該艦トス(中日本公長家ヲドノ巡風通常艦セ  
ントスルモノナルヤ今日過ノ交番ニ於テ該艦ヲ  
銀ク船少カラサル元假ニ所謂國軍駆逐ニ(一式駆  
反佈鐵印辰天孫ニ於ケル正兵反叛兵國兵(二支那  
ニ於ケル正兵是國上ノ兵主別付過)三國條約ノ  
解釋及履行問題カ米公主張過リニ妥結セラルル  
モノト假定スル時ヘ  
「帝國政府ノ立場等既完遂ハ大東亜共榮圈建設ノ大業  
ニ關シ第三國國兵ノ餘地ヲ具リルコトナリ、リ  
故カ自主外交ニ爲分懈怠ヲ取クルカ如キ種ヲ  
蟲之合ビ國內ニ於テ相當ハ兵事的夢想  
ハ公私ア純粋ハム事スベホシ之ヲ全般のニ  
此いハ該御立場ハ幹部首ニ於シ専分體心セ  
ラルル望シアリ他方御公ア文書、御函ヲ中心、心  
トスル帝國ハ平和的進心ハ公スコトニ依リ、未  
幾山ハ清達的諭諭ヲ爲シ行サルニアラサルヘ

ハ又、帝國、國防、方テ保有スル事トニ、係リ他ハ列  
強力、軍人、爲メ、意欲セル、眞國ノ、蒙言、信ハ音  
六ヲ、抑シ得ヘキ以テ、他日ハ、乘隙ニ、屬ヘ、シ、  
從テ、實質的ニハ、方ニ、必スシモ、六ナル不祥ヲ、  
不、タスモノ、モ、トハ、記メ難キモ、内、外、諸、狀、  
シ、少、ヨリ、ラク、極、ヲ、加フルニ、於テ、ハ、諸種不利ハ、點  
ラサルニ、由リ、宗樂ハ、此後ニテハ、安堵シ矣

#### 一 文部及鶴山係ニ就

(ア) 現下ノ事態ニ於テ、日米交渉ノ妥結ハ、文部事務  
解消時ノ方策ニシテ、右以外解消ノ風込緒

シ

- (口) 米側四原則ニハ、武力ニ依ル、張打戦ヲ認メサ  
サル、専旨ノモノアリト、國モ、試方、交渉ノ日、或  
和平條件中「滿洲國ノ承認」ニ付、米側ハ、何  
等異議ヲ唱ヘ、后ラサルヲ以テ、之カ實現ヲ見  
ハ、而、滿洲國ノ地位一層確立セラルベシ
- (ハ) 文部ニ於ケル、經濟活動ニ付、國際通商上ノ平  
等原則ヲ認メタル機會ニ於テ、モ、事變首ニ比  
シ、格別ノ不測、金ナキノミナラス事、今日ノ  
既成ノ事實ヲ維持スルコトニ、伏リ、幾多ノ事

先的地歩ヲ保持シ得ヘン元モ將來右原則ヲ  
續ニ英米等ヨリ種々苦情ヲ提起シ本ルカ如キ  
コトアルヲ強信セサルヘカラス

(二) 庚戌條項ニ付日本國ニ約諾ヲ爲ササル場合  
ニ於テモ敵兵ニ付テハ必仰ニ於テ一西年附  
ノ猶豫ヘ之ヲ認ムヘシト想察セラルノミ  
ナラス日文和平交渉ノ目的既而中國該交渉ニ  
依リ駐兵ヲ認メシハルコトシテモ不可能事  
ナラサルヘシ

(三) 日文國和平成立支那側ノ以誠心宣ニが済ス  
ルヤ經年アルモ多年ノ間此ニ實掌セル一億  
民衆ハ平和ヲ慕追シ日本國國事ヲ謂シ兵ノ  
結果經濟合作ニ付テモ屬方的態度ニ当ツヘ  
テコト誠意セラル

(四) 本邦政府力南京政府與人ヲ包含スベザニモ  
鑑ミ政治經濟其ノ體制固に管ニ被服ノ論證  
初見ノ回復、海島歸度ノ適用等ニ付相應根  
據ノ機構ヲ期待シ得ヘシ

一 佛印、泰、萬印等ニ關スル事項

(A) 佛印ニ付テハ現行日本爲印制請取法ニ依キ  
既ニ侵越的地上ヲ國メ后ルヲ以テ機會撤兵  
ヲ實行スル後ニ於テモ我カ方ノ地盤宣威ヲ  
得ルニ於テハ兩國ノ邊境ヲ增進スルヲ得ヘ  
シ

(B) 泰ニ付テハ列國ノ侵略ヲ恐ルコトナキニ  
至リ自然日本關係モ從前ニ比シ漸次歐洲増  
進セラレ我方必更切責タルモノ買付等ヲ容  
易ナラシムヘシ

(C) 萬印其包南方諸國ニ過面平等ア原則カ行  
ハルル結果石油、鐵礦、銅、「ボ」チサイ  
ドー等帝國必長國防資源ノ獲得カ容易トナ  
ルヘシ

二 兵備ノ事項

(A) 日米關係ノ改善ニ就ル利益ハ必ラバシモ事  
業前ニ比シ大ナリト屬フヲ得サルモ政治的  
不安ノ様カルト共ニ新通商條約モ締結セ  
ラルニ至ルヘシ從事ノ點入ヘ歐洲侵奪ト  
ノ關係モアリ相當國海ヲ走クヘキモ鬼ニ角  
石油 兵備相當量ノ國防資源獲得可也トナリ

アリ

中南米地方ニ於ケル無差別行進ト相換ツテ  
東亜新秩序ノ運営ニハ少カラサル好影響ヲ  
與フヘシ次第世界平和实现ノ爲日米カ重  
要ナル當時ヲ済スル途程ヲ蒙キ得ルコトト  
ナル洞悉アリ  
(a) 諸島關係ニ於テ武方ノ犯歩陸軍トナルニ從  
ヒ前次平和的交渉ニタル長宗實徳ノ可能性  
増大スヘシ  
尙未決ノ承諾ノ動向ハ  
(ア) 東亜ノ問題ニ關シ列國容隊ヲ招來スル慣ア  
ルコト  
(ロ) 日本国艦ノ活動ヲ見ルベキコト  
(ハ) 九國條約ノ再確認トナルヘキコト  
(ニ) 日獨伊山條ニ好マシカラサル影響ヲ與フ元帥  
アルコト等ハ不利ノ點ドシテ認ムルヲ要ス

フ

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局  
國際檢察部 第三一一號

Dec. 3/1/

與機及ビ公正ニ滿スル證明  
余、杯等ハヤシカエハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
即チ、日本外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的  
關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲  
ニ添附セラレタル、八百ヨリ成ル、千九百〇八年  
ノ昭和〇年十月二日米覺督全的ニ容認セル場合帝國ノ國際地位就中對  
支地位ハ事變前ニ比シ如何ニ變化スルヤノ又督ノ係  
管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記載及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ機ノナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ機番號又ハ引  
用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ機ニ於ケル該文書ノ成程所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ  
特記スベシ)

外務省

千九百四十七年ノ昭和二十二年十一月五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名ハヤシカエ署名捺印/

右ノ省ノ公的資格 文書課長

證人 檢部局長ウラベ署名

大英

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ヘンリー・シモジマ/HENRY SHIMOJIMA/ハ余ガ船  
合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、  
茲ニ上記證E/HENRY SHIMOJIMA/ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官  
吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

一千九百四十七年/昭和二十二年/十一月五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 ヘンリー・シモジマ /署名/  
右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際檢査總部調査官  
證人 ジエラード・ムーンロウ /署名/

C. S. M.